In this paper, we study the structure of optimal contracts in a banking system when there is no risk of moral hazard. We consider a risk management problem under a policy that reduces the excessive risk taking behavior by making all banks bear part of the risk that they transfer to other parties in the market. First, we characterize the optimal solutions to the risk management problem, and, second, we find a necessary and sufficient condition under which the "risk of the tail events" will not be transferred. In particular, we will study the problem using two known risk measures, Value at Risk and Conditional Value at Risk, and will show that in these cases the optimal solutions are in the form of stop-loss policies.
Introduction
In the light of the 2008 financial crisis and its aftermath, moral hazard has become an important issue for the policy makers. It is known that moral hazard is responsible for the excessive risk taking behavior in the financial markets, either taken by hedgefunds or banks. A moral hazard is a situation when some agents take excessive risk because the costs of taking risk will not be felt by them. In other words, a moral hazard occurs since some agents know the potential costs of taking further risk will be borne by other agents and/or the government. Perhaps the best example when the moral hazard happened on a large-scale was during the years preceding the financial crisis of 2008. In that period, two matters caused the moral hazard: first, the extensive use of deposit-insurances, which demotivated hedge-funds to be cautious about their investments and, second, the securitization of mortgage-backed securities, which demotivated banks to carefully screen the prospective mortgage holders. In both cases the problem was to shift the risk of the tail events to other parties, for example insurance companies or security buyers, without taking any responsibility about losses. For more reading on the impact of deposit-insurances on the banking system see Collins (1988) , Kaufman (1988) , Dowd (1996) and Freixas and Rochet (2008) .
Moral hazard was first discussed by Kenneth Arrow (e.g., Arrow (1971) ) as an inevitable risk caused by altering a policyholder's incentives when he/she shifts his/her risk to an insurer 1 (see also Heimer (1989) ). However, as discussed above, in a banking system, moral hazard is mainly caused by a risk taking appetite in the absence of enough prudential policies. While it is widely believed that the minimum capital requirement can prevent the excessive risk taking behavior by putting banks' equity at risk, Hellmann et al. (2000) showed that it also can encourage further risk taking by harming banks' franchise values. They show that, by adding deposit-rate controls as a regulatory instrument, this problem can be partly avoided. However, after 2008, it is proven that neither these measures nor any other instruments of prudential control can prevent another crisis if the excessive risk taking behavior, and so the moral hazard, cannot be controlled. For a good reading on moral hazard during the 2008 financial crisis see Dowd (2009) .
2
One way to reduce the excessive risk taking behavior is to reduce the banks' moral hazard problem by making them pay the real cost of their risk taking. One can consider two different approaches to achieve this: an ex-ante approach by setting built-in incentives, and an ex-post approach by penalizing the bad behavior (see similar discussion for market discipline in Freixas and Rochet (2008) ). In this paper, we set an ex-ante approach, where banks have to bear part of any risk that they introduce to the system. We consider a bank that wants to optimally shift part of the risk of its position to the other parties in the market (for instance by writing some insurance contracts). The regulation makes the bank mutualize both the shifted risk, which is transferred to the system, and the remaining risk, which is borne by the bank. By adopting a complete market model as in Merton (1977) 3 , we will fully characterize the optimal contracts and we will see that, in particular cases of Value at Risk (VaR) and Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR), the contracts are in the form of stop-loss policies. This motivates banks to take care of the smaller amounts of the risk, which lie below a certain deductible level, and the greater amounts of the risk (associated with the tail events), which lie above a certain retention level. Next, we focus our attention on the risk of the tail events. Briefly, a tail event consists of all scenarios under which the value of the risk variable is above a certain number 4 . This is a risk that, in principal, all banks want to transfer to other parties in the market. We will establish a necessary and sufficient condition under which the risk of the tail events is not transferred. We will see that, if the banks use VaR or CVaR to measure their global risk, the risk of the tail events will not be transferred to the system. Remarkably, unlike Merton (1977) where the insurance contracts are considered with unbounded retention levels, because they are in the form of put options, our no-moral-hazard assumption puts a limit on the upper values of any contract. The results of this paper can properly be linked to the systemic risk. As a matterof fact deposit insurances are just financial tolls that transfer the risk of losses to other parties in the market, and therefore, cannot mitigate the risk of the system. This means that the tail events cannot be avoided unless the excessive risk taking behavior is demotivated within an ex-ante (or ex-post) policy, which will be studied in this paper.
It is worth mentioning that the relation between moral hazard and the risk of the tail events has previously been studied in the literature of insurance. For instance, Froot (2001) shows that the insurance companies are reluctant to buy reinsurance contracts for catastrophe risks, and Bernard and Bernard and Tian (2009) give some theoretical justification for this behavior.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the mathematical notions and notations that we use in this paper. In Section 3 the general set-up of our risk management problem will be presented. In Section 4 we will present the solution to the risk management problem under our no-moral-hazard prudential policies. We also provide criteria with which the regulator can make sure that the risk of the tail events is not transferred.
Preliminaries and Notations
Let (Ω, P, F) be a probability space, where Ω is the "states of the nature", P is the physical probability measure and F is the σ-field of measurable subsets of Ω. Let p, q ∈ [1, ∞] be two numbers such that 1/p + 1/q = 1. We denote the space of all random variables with p'th finite moment with L p , i.e., L p = {X : Ω → R : E (|X| p ) < ∞}, where E denotes the expectation w.r.t P . In this paper, we consider only two period of time, 0 and T , where 0 represents the beginning of the year, when a contract is written, and T represents the end of the year, when liabilities are settled. Every random variable represents losses at time T . For any X ∈ L P , the cumulative distribution function associated with X is denoted by F X .
Distortion Risk Measures
Let g be a non-decreasing real function from [0, 1] to [0, 1] such that g(0) = 1−g(1) = 0. A distortion risk measure (see for example Wang et al. (1997) and Sereda et al. (2010) ) is a mapping from L p to R ∪ {∞} and is introduced as
where S X = 1 − F X is the survival function associated with X. In the literature, g is known as the distortion function. A more convenient representation for a distortion risk measure can be found in terms of Value at Risk. Let Π(x) = 1 − g(1 − x). By a simple change of variable, one can see that the distortion form (1) can be represented as
where
A popular example of a distortion risk measure is Value at Risk (VaR), where
This form is a bit more general than the usual definition of a distortion risk measure, since we assumed for the moment that X could be any member of L p . Actually, this is a particular form of the Choquet integral, when the capacity v is given by v(S) = g(P (S)), for any measurable set S ∈ F. distortion risk measure whose distortion function is given by Π(t) =
, and can be represented as
In the sequel, we denote sometimes the risk measure in (2) with Π to show its connection with Π.
A popular example of a risk premium is a Wang's premium introduced by the following distortion function known as Wang's transformation
where β ∈ R is a real number and Φ is the CDF of the normal distribution with the mean equal to zero and the standard deviation equal to one. Actually, the Wang's premium is used to price a risk variable, however, it is also an appropriate risk measure if risk is regarded as the price of the risky position. The parameter β represents the level of risk aversion of an agent, and also represents the agents expectations from the market risk-premium. That is why we call it the "expected market risk-premium". It is not very difficult to see that
The family of spectral risk measures which was introduced first in Acerbi (2002) , has the same representation as (2), where Π is also convex. One can readily see that Π is positive homogenous, translation invariant, monotone, law invariant and co-monotonic additive. It can be shown that all law-invariant co-monotone additive coherent risk measures can be represented as (2); see Kusuoka (2001) . A risk measure in the form (2) is important from different perspectives. First of all it makes a link between the risk measures theory and the behavioral finance as the form (2) is a particular form of Choquet utility. Second, (2) contains a family of risk measures which are statistically robust. In Cont et al. (2010) it is shown that a risk measure (x) =´1 0 VaR t (x)dΠ(t) is robust if and only if the support of Π is away from zero and one. For example Value at Risk is a risk measure with this property. For more reading on distortion risk measures one can see Sereda et al. (2010) , Wu and Zhou (2006) , Balbás et al. (2009) and Wang et al. (1997) .
Model and Problem Set-up
Let X 0 ≥ 0 denote a loss variable for a bank's business. The bank aims to outsource part of the risk, denoted by X with values in [0, X 0 ], through a contract. The contract's market-value is E (ϕX), where ϕ is a stochastic discount factor evaluating risky positions in the market. Therefore, the bank's global position is composed of a part whose risk is not transferred, X 0 − X, and an amount that is payed for the contract, E(ϕX). Hence the bank's global position is X 0 − X + E(ϕX). Bank's optimal contract will be found by minimizing the global risk
By cash-invariance property of this is equivalent to
Let us now focus our attention on the market evaluation of risk and the stochastic discount factor. Inspired by Merton (1977) , we assume the market is complete and set up a Black-Scholes model. Assume the following geometric Brownian motion
where W t is the Wiener process, and µ and σ are the drift and volatility, respectively. One can solve this SDE and find S t however, in this paper we will be working with the discounted processS t = exp (−rt) S t which can be given bỹ
where m = µ − r and r is the risk-free interest rate. In that case, it is known that the market is complete and the unique martingale measure Q has the density
where T is the time horizon. We will be using the following relation between ϕ and the price process of the stock, cf Nakano (2004) .
It is then easily seen that ϕ is a decreasing function of the underlying assetS T . After introducing the model, we go back to the loss variable. We assume that the bank's loss is given by X 0 = L S T , where L : R → R + is a non-increasing function.
A natural example is L(x) = S 0 exp (log (x/S 0 )) − , where (x) − = min {x, 0}. This loss function focuses on the scenarios when the return is negative.
Given that ϕ is a decreasing function of the underlying assetS T , the HardyLittlewood Inequality implies that
where Γ(x) =´x 0 VaR α (ϕ)dα. On the other hand,
where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of a normal random variable with mean zero and variance one. Therefore,
Given this, one can show further that
which clearly gives a distortion function associated with a Wang's premium when β = m √ T σ (see Wang (2000) ).
As it was discussed earlier, we assume that the market regulation is toward avoiding moral hazard. To this end, we set up for an ex-ante policy under which all contracts in the market have to be issued in a way that the losses can be felt by both the issuer and the holder. Therefore, the contracts have to move co-monotonically with the total risk. Assuming that a contract is a function of the risk X 0 , denoted by f , the contract X = f (X 0 ) is appropriate if the bank bears the risk generated by the risk variable X 0 . Therefore, the un-shifted risk, X 0 − f (X 0 ), which is borne by the bank, has to be non-decreasing in X 0 . On the other hand, since the banks are rational, they also want to outsource the losses; that is why they consider contracts are non-decreasing in X 0 . As a result, both the functions x → f (x) and x → x − f (x) have to be non-decreasing. To set this economic assumption on a sound mathematical basis, we introduce the following set of admissible contracts as
where C = {f ≥ 0|f (x) and x − f (x) are non-decreasing}.
Note that all members in C are Lipschitz continuous since for any 0 ≤ x 1 ≤ x 2 we have
Now , we rewrite the problem (5) as follows
It is known that if a function f is Lipschitz continuous, it is almost everywhere differentiable and its derivative is essentially bounded by its Lipschitz constant. As a result, C can be represented as
We introduce the set of marginal contracts as
Definition 1. For any indemnification function f ∈ C, the associated marginal contract is a function h ∈ D such that
The interpretation of a marginal contract is as follows: if f (x) =´x 0 h(t)dt is a contract, then at each value X 0 = x, a marginal change δ to the value of the total risk will result in marginal change of the contract in the size δh(x). We will see in the following that in our framework the marginal change of an optimal contract is either 0 or δ, i.e., h = 0 or 1.
Optimal Solutions and Risk of Tail Events

Main Results
In this section, we will characterize the optimal solutions to the risk management problem (7) and discuss the level of the tail risk that can be transferred to the system. As a tail event we mean {X 0 ≥ B}, for some positive number B ∈ R. Indeed, a tail event is associated with large losses of the position S T . This is the riskiest part of the position S T and as a matter of fact, this is the part that all banks, under a poor regulation, would like to get rid of. We say that the risk of the tail events cannot be transferred if there is B > 0, such that the bank's optimal contract X = f (X 0 ) is bounded by B. In the following, we will discuss that transferring the risk of the tail events is impossible if the risk measures are not too sensitive about big losses. This will give the regulator a benchmark to avoid risk of moral hazard. We will see that this is usually the case for the known risk measures such as VaR and CVaR. We also give examples that the risk of the tail events would be transferred as a result of optimal decision-making process.
Here we have the optimal solution Theorem 1. The solution to the general optimization problem (7) is given by f
whereh could be any function between 0 and 1 on Γ (F X 0 (t)) = Π (F X 0 (t)).
Proof. Let f ∈ C. Since f (x) and x − f (x) are both non-decreasing, and also since VaR t commutes with monotone functions, we get
. (9) Let h ∈ D be the derivative of f , i.e., f (x) =´x 0 h(t)dt. Therefore, we have
First, we assume X 0 is bounded. By Fubini's Theorem, (10) gives
Now, it is clear that h * minimizes (11). It is also clear that we are free to choose the values of h * on Π (F X 0 (t)) = Γ (F X 0 (t)). The value of the minimum also is equal tô
whereΠ(x) = min {Γ(x), Π(x)}. Now, let us in general assume that X 0 is not bounded. It is clear that at each point t, {Π • F X 0 ∧n (t)} n=1,2,... is non-increasing with respect to n. On the other hand, for any t, there exist n t such that if n > n t then F X 0 ∧n (t) = F X 0 (t). Therefore, for any t, we have that Π(F X 0 ∧n (t)) ↓ Π(F X 0 (t)). Now by Monotone Convergence Theorem we have that
for any function h ∈ D. The same is true if we replace Π by Γ. Using this fact and that f is non-decreasing, we have
The rest of the proof follows the same lines after (10).
Remark 1. As oppose to Merton (1977) , where it is assumed that an insurance contract is similar to an option, our assumptions give raise to the contracts that are bounded from above. This will be better observe when we study particular cases of VaR and CVaR in the following section. Now, we discuss the risk of the tail events. First, we have the following lemma from discussions in Section 4 Lemma 1. Following all notation above, Γ (α) = exp
The following theorem is an implication of the previous lemma Theorem 2. Assume Π is differentiable around 1 and that X 0 is unbounded above. If m = 0, the risk of the tail events cannot be transferred iff
If m = 0, the tail events cannot be transferred if and only if lim inf α→1 Π (α) < 1.
Proof. By definition, the risk of the tail events cannot be transferred to the market if there is B > 0 such that X ≤ B, P −a.s. According to Theorem 1, this means
Since X 0 is unbounded above this is equivalent to the fact that h * (β n ) = 0 for a sequence β n converging to 1. By (8), this is equivalent to the fact that Γ(β n ) < Π(β n ). Since Π is differentiable around 1 and that Γ(1) = Π(1) = 1, it is easy to see that the last inequality is equivalent to the existence of a sequence α n → 1, such that Γ (α n ) > Π(α n ). On its own this is equivalent to lim sup α→1 Γ (α)/Π (α) > 1. Using Lemma 1, this inequality is equivalent to
Given that the logarithm function is an increasing function, one can see that the inequality (12) is equivalent to lim sup α→1
This implies that for a small positive number δ,
. If we divide the both sides of this inequality by Φ −1 (α), it is equivalent to
Since
↑ 0 as α → 1, the inequality (13) is equivalent to lim sup α→1
> 0. If we put y = Φ −1 (α), then the theorem is proven for m = 0. If m = 0 then Γ (α) = 1, ∀α ∈ (0, 1). Therefore, lim sup α→1 Γ (α)/Π (α) > 1, is equivalent to lim inf α→1 Π (α) < 1.
This theorem provides the regulator with the degree of the risk measure sensitivity with respect to the large losses, in order to avoid outsourcing the risk of the tail events.
Remark 2. It can be easily seen that if the risk measure is a distortion risk measure given by distortion function g β as in (4), then lim sup y→+∞ log(Π (Φ(y))) y = β, which is the expected market risk premium. That is why one can consider lim sup y→+∞ log(Π (Φ(y))) y as the generalized excepted market risk premium. With this in mind, then one can say that the risk of the tail events will not be transferred if an only if the generalized expected market risk premium is less than the real one. This makes sense if we look at the problem from an investor point of view: if the expected market risk premium is higher than the real one, one could tolerate the risk of the tail event in a hope to receive a higher (spread) premium.
Corollaries and Examples
Corollary 1. If = VaR α , then the optimal solution can be described as
Proof. We know that since = VaR α , Π(t) = 1 [α,1] (t). First of all since Γ (1) = +∞ then Π is greater than Γ around 1. Since Γ is a strictly increasing function between zero and one, then Γ (F X 0 (t)) > Π (F X 0 (t)) if and only if F X 0 (t) < α. Therefore,
This results in
Since X 0 = L(S T ), and since VaR and decreasing functions can commute, we have
On the other hand, since W T ∼ N (0, T ),
which completes the proof.
Example 1. Let us assume that L(x) = S 0 exp (log (x/S 0 )) − . In this case we have
Corollary 2. If = CVaR α then the optimal solution can be described as
where α * is a solution to
Proof. In this case Π(x) = x−α 1−α 1 [α,1] . First of all since Γ (1) = +∞ then Π is greater than Γ around 1. Note that since the function Γ is strictly increasing and also because Π is linear between α and 1, the solution to the equation (1 − α)Γ(x) − x + α = 0 is unique. Now, it is clear that Γ (
, as long as F X 0 (t) < α * . Therefore, h * equals to one as long as F X 0 < α * . The rest of the proof is similar to the previous corollary.
As one can see α * is always greater than α. This means that CVaR allows for more risk to be transferred rather than VaR. In the following figure we have depicted the differences between α and α * . Example 2. Let us assume that L(x) = exp (log (x/S 0 )) − . In this case we have
where Y is defined by (14).
Corollary 3. If m = 0 and = VaR α or = CVaR α , the risk of the tail events are not transferred to the system. If m = 0 and = VaR α then the risk of tail events are not transferred to the system whereas the opposite holds for m = 0 and = CVaR α .
Final remarks
In this paper we developed a framework for studying the deposit insurances and the risk of tail events. In order to control the risk of moral hazard, inspired by the excessive risk taking behavior, deposit insurances must have a stop loss structure. We also studied the risk of tail events and the circumstances that this risk cannot be avoided. For technical reasons we have chosen to study deposit insurances for the family of distortion risk measures, including VaR and CVaR. However, for future research one can consider an extension of our setting to the family of law-invariant coherent risk measure. This extension would be possible in light of the law-invariant coherent risk measures' representation given in Kusuoka (2001) . Another extension is to study this problem in an incomplete market framework. For instance, one can use the Heston model for pricing the assets in the financial market.
